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HYPNOTIC EVIDENCE
Paul C. Giannelli
Professor of Law
Case Western Reserve University
In 1897, the California Supreme Court wrote that
"the law of the United States does not recognize
hypnotism." People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, 665, 49
P. 1049, 1053 (1897). In 1902, a Yale Law Journal
article warned against the dangers of hypnotically
influenced evidence. Ladd, Legal Aspects of Hypnotism, 11 Yale L.J. 173, 187-89 (1902). Nevertheless, the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed
testimony is one of the most litigated evidentiary
issues currently confronting the courts. The judicial response to this issue has varied. Some courts
have upheld admissibility, while others have
rejected it. Still other courts have imposed various
conditions on admissibility.
This article examines the admissibility of hypnotically influenced statements and testimony.
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THE TECHNIQUE
Hypnosis is a state of heightened concentration
with a concomitant diminished awareness of peripheral events. See Encyclopedia Britannica 133
(15th ed. 1977) (hypnosis "refers to a sleeplike
state that nevertheless permits a wide range of
behavioral responses to stimulation"). The various
techniques of hypnotic induction involve establishing rapport between the subject and hypnotist;
inducing a passiveness that makes the subject
receptive to suggestion, often by engendering eye
fatigue through the focusing on a close object;
and inducing a trance-like state through a series of
suggestions. One widely employed procedure is
called hypnotic age regression, during which the
subject relives an event which has occurred in the
past.
Hypnosis has been recognized as a legitimate
subject of clinical and laboratory research. It is
- also an accepted medical technique for psychotherapy, the treatment of psychosomatic illnesses,
anesthesia, and memory recall. See Council on
Medical Health of the American Medical Association, Medical Use of Hypnosis, 168 J.A.M.A. 186
(1958).
Distinguishing between the clinical and forensic
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use of hypnosis is critical. As one commentator
has noted:
The clinical use of hypnosis is very different from the
forensic use. The police officer is concerned with
establishing facts. Psychiatrists and psychologists
use hypnosis in an effort to alleviate distress. Hypnosis helps to build a trusting relationship between doctor and patient which is important in the treatment
process. It can help the patient work out symptoms
even though his or her beliefs about his or her illness
are entirely erroneous. Dentists, obstetricians, and
anesthesiologists use hypnosis entirely for the control
of pain. Levitt, The Use of Hypnosis to "Freshen" the
Memory of Witnesses or Victims, Trial 56-58 (Apr.
1981).

Notwithstanding this difference, the use of hypnosis in crime investigation has become widespread in recent years. Two factors may account
for this trend. First, the "technique of hypnosis
induction is easily learned. A police officer can
become a reasonably skilled hypnotist in a few
hours of practice, with or without formal instruction." Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of
Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68
Cal. L. Rev. 313, 314 (1980). Second, a number of
books and articles on the subject have advocated
its use. See H. Arons, Hypnosis in Criminal Investigation (1967); W. Bryan, Legal Aspects of Hypnosis
(1962); M. Teitelbaum, Hypnosis Induction Technics (1969); Reiser, Hypnosis as a Tool in Criminal
Investigation, Police Chief 36 (Nov. 1976). The
value of these works, however, is suspect. One
expert has written: "These books make extravagant clafms of the usefulness and reliability of
hypnosis for criminal investigative purposes." Diamond, supra, at 313 n.3.
THE STANDARD
The initial question in determining the admissibility of hypnotically enhanced evidence concerns
the applicable standard. In considering scientific
evidence, most jurisdictions follow the general
acceptance standard, first set forth in Frye v. U.S.,
293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923). Under the Frye test, evi.
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dence derived from a new scientific technique is
admissible only if it is "sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs." /d. at 1014.
While the Frye test is the majority rule, a number of courts have rejected it. See U.S. v. Williams,
583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1117 (1979) (voiceprints); State v. Hall, 297 N. W .2d
80 (Iowa 1980) (blood tests); State v. Williams, 388
A.2d 500 (Me. 1978) (voiceprints). See generally
Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later,
80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197 (1980); McCormick,
Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to
Admissibility, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 879 (1982); Note,
Expert Testimony Based on Novel Scientific Techniques: Admissibility Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 48 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 774 (1980).
Even in those jurisdictions that have adopted
the Frye test, the question remains whether that
test should be applied to hypnotically enhanced
evidence. This issue is discussed later in this
article in connection with the various cases that
have addressed it.

App. 718, 727-30, 273 N.W.2d 539, 543-44 (1978);
Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316, 1326-28 (Okla. Grim.
1975); State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23, 30, 207 S.E.2d
414, 418 (1974). See also Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 442
(1979).
In People v. Blair, 25 Cal.3d 640, 159 Cal. Rptr.
818, 602 P.2d 738 (1979), the California Supreme
Court also held that hypnotic statements were
inadmissible. In addition, the court rejected the
defendant's constitutional argument that the
exclusion of such evidence denied him the right to
present defense evidence under Chambers v. Mississippi. According to the court, "the trial court's
ruling [of exclusion] did not elevate a fastidious
adherence to the technicalities of the law of evidence over the right to a fair trial. For here, unlike
Chambers, there was no solid assurance that the
hearsay statements were reliable." 25 Cal.3d at
665. As one commentator has noted, these decisions are supported by scientific data:
[E]xperience with a research design where deeply hypnotized subjects and unhypnotizable subjects
instructed to feign hypnosis are seen by hypnotists
who are unaware of the subjects' actual status ... has
shown that it is possible to deceive even highly experienced hypnotists .... Not only can individuals fake
hypnosis, but even subjects who are genuinely in
deep hypnosis are nonetheless able to wilfully lie ....
Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, in 3
Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research 61,
64 (ed. M. Toney & H. Morris 1982).

HYPNOTICALLY INDUCED STATEMENTS

Hypnotically influenced evidence can be. used in
several different ways. For example, statements
made by a witness while hypnotized may be
offered at trial. In addition, the testimony of a witness whose memory has been "refreshed" by hypnosis prior to trial may be offered.
Courts have uniformly rejected statements made
while the subject is hypnotized and offered for the
truth of the matters asserted. In the leading case,
Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204
S.E.2d 414 (1974), the defendant, who claimed no
recollection of the charged offense, offered statements about the offense that he made while hypnotized. The Virginia Supreme Court held the statements inadmissible. The court rested its decision
on the unreliability of such statements: "Most
experts agree that hypnotic evidence is unreliable
because a person under hypnosis can manufacture
or invent false statements .... A person under a
hypnotic trance is also subject to heightened suggestibility." /d. at 419. In a subsequent habeas
corpus proceeding, a federal district court agreed.
In rejecting the defendant's due process argument,
asserted under the authority of Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), the court wrote: "[T]he
very reason for excluding hypnotic evidence is due
to its potential unreliability." Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113, 1120 (W.O. Va. 1976).
Other courts have reached the same result. See
Rodriguez v. State, 327 So.2d 903 (Fla. App. 1976);
Emmett v. State, 232 Ga. 110, 115, 205 S.E.2d 231,
235 (1974); Strong v. State, 435 N.E.2d 969 (Ind.
1982); State v. Conley, 6 Kan. App.2d 280, 285, 627
P.2d 1174, 1178 (1981); State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860,
886-88, 46 N.W.2d 508, 521-22 (1950); State v.
Harris, 241 Or. 224, 237, 405 P.2d 492, 498 (1965);
People v. Harper, 111 Ill. App.2d 204, 209, 250
N.E.2d 5, 7 (1969); People v. Hangsleben, 86 Mich.

HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY

Harding v. State
The seminal case on the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony is Harding v. State, 5
Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 949 (1969). The witness in that case, Mildred
Coley, was found wounded by a roadside, the
apparent victim of a sexual assault. She was in a
state of shock and could not remember what had
occurred. After hypnosis, she provided information
incriminating the defendant. The court summarily
dismissed the defendant'.s objection to her testimony, stating:
The admissibility of Mildred Coley's testimony concerning the assault with intent to rape causes no difficulty. On the witness stand she recited the facts and
stated that she was doing so from her own recollection. The fact that she had told different stories or
had achieved her present knowledge after being hypnotized concerns the question of the weight of the evidence which the trier of facts, in this case, the jury,
must decide. 246 A.2d at 306.

During the next decade a number of courts followed the Harding precedent and admitted hypnotically refreshed testimony. The federal cases
include: U.S. v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979); U.S. v. Adams, 581
F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006
(1978); Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067,
1069-70 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller
Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 509-10 (9th Cir. 1974); U.S. v.
Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 281-82 (E.D. Mich._ 1977).
See also Annot., 50 A.l.R. Fed. 602 (1980).
2

hypnotized to remember and who have urged that
it is important that he or she remember certain
events." Fourth, "there is no way to determine
from the content of the 'memory' itself which parts
of it are historically accurate, which are entirely
fanciful, and which are lies." Finally, a memory
"produced under hypnosis becomes hardened in
the subject's mind. A witness who was unclear
about his 'story' before the hypnotic session
becomes convinced of the absolute truth of the
account he made while under hypnosis." /d. at
768-69. See also State v. Koehler, 312 N.W.2d 108
(Minn. 1981) (reaffirming Mack).

The state cases include: People v. Diggs, 112
Cal. App. 3d 522, 169 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1980); Clark v.
State, 379 So.2d 372, 375 (Fla. App. 1980); Creamer
v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 138, 205 S.E.2d 240, 242
(1974); People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385
(r(j N.E.2d 848 (1979); State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423,
435-36 (Mo. App. 1980), vacated on other grounds,
450 U.S.-1027 (1981); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C.
96, 119-22, 244 S.E.2d 414, 427-29 (1978); State v.
Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 9, 492 P.2d 312, 315 (1971).
Although admitting hypnotically refreshed testimony, some of these courts began to scrutinize
this evidence more critically than did the Harding
court. For example, the Ninth Circuit in Adams
noted: "We are concerned, however, that the investigatory use of hypnosis on persons who may later
be called upon to testify in court carries a dangerous potential for abuse. Great care must be exercised to insure that statements after hypnosis are
the product of the subject's own recollection,
rather than of recall tainted by suggestions
received while under hypnosis." 581 F.2d at 198-99.
The court also suggested several procedural safeguards: "We think that, at a minimum, complete
stenographic records of interviews of hypnotized
persons who later testify should be maintained.
Only if the judge, jury, and the opponent know who
was present, questions that were asked, and the
witness's responses can the matter be dealt with
effectively. An audio or video recording of the
interview would be helpful." /d. at 199 n.12.
Similarly, the Illinois appellate court in Smrekar
l1ii did not automatically accept the witness' state\1\f) ments that her testimony was based on her own
recollection. Rather, the court also considered
other factors: "(1) the hypnotist was shown to be
competent, (2) the evidence indicated that suggestion was not used in the hypnosis, (3) the identification was corroborated by other substantial evidence unknown to the witness at the time she
made positive identification of the defendant, and
(4) the evidence showed that at the time of the
occurrence, the witness had ample opportunity to
view him." 385 N.E.2d at 855.
State v. Mack
One of the first cases to reject the trend toward
admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony
was State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
Mack was charged with criminal sexual conduct
and aggravated assault. The alleged victim was initially unable to recall the circumstances under
which she was injured. After hypnosis, she
recalled the details of Mack's involvement. On
appeal, the defendant contended that hypnotically
refreshed testimony was inadmissible because it
failed to meet the Frye general acceptance test.
The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed. The court
found several problems with such testimony. First,
the "hypnotized subject is highly susceptible to
• suggestion, even that which is subtle and unin~> tended." Second, the "hypnotized subject is
influenced by a need to 'fill gaps.'" Third, the subject is influenced by a "desire to please either the
hypnotist or others who have asked the person

State v. Mena
Following Mack, the Arizona Supreme Court considered the issue in State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226,
624 P.2d 1274 (1981). It also rejected admissibility.
The court found the reasoning of the cases admitting hypnotically refreshed testimony flawed
because those cases relied on two assumptions:
(1) that witnesses' statements that they were testifying from their own recollections were reliable
and (2) that cross-examination would permit the
jury to assess adequately the witnesses' testimony. According to the court, the assumption that
a witness is capable of determining that "what he
perceives as his recollection actually came from
his prior observations as opposed to impressions
planted in his memory through hypnosis ... is contrary to the opinion held by many authorities .... "
/d. at 1278. Moreover, the "faith which ... courts
place in the power of cross-examination also
seems misplaced ... [because the witness] will
often be more convinced of the accuracy of such
hypnotically induced memories than those recalled
due to the witness' actual observations.'' /d.
Accordingly, the court held that hypnotically
refreshed testimony failed to satisfy the Frye general acceptance test: "[U]ntil hypnosis gains general acceptance in the fields of medicine and psychiatry as a method by which memories are accurately improved without undue danger of distortion, delusion or fantasy, we feel that testimony of
witnesses which has been tainted by hypnosis
should be excluded in criminal cases.'' /d. at 1279.
More importantly, the court also rested its decision on constitutional grounds:
As mentioned above, there is a strong belief among
several authorities that hypnotism of a witness
renders subsequent cross-examination ineffective
.... Until the general scientific reliability of hypnotism as an effective and accurate memory enhancer
has been established and/or the barriers which it
raises to effective cross-examination are somehow
overcome, we think the confrontation clause of the
Sixth Amendment requires [exclusion of the testimony]. /d. at 1280.

As discussed later, Mena was modified in one
respect in State ex ref. Collins v. Superior Court,
132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982).
State v. Hurd
The next decided case, State v. Hurd, 86 N.J.
525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981), is important because the
3

1981); People v. McDowell, 103 Misc.2d 831, 427
N.Y.S.2d 181 (1980) (specifying 9 requirements);
People v. Lewis, 103 Misc.2d 881, 427 N.Y.S.2d 177
(1980). See also People v. Lucas, 107 Misc.2d 231,
435 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1980).
A second group of cases adopted a per se rule
of exclusion, rejecting the Hurd safeguards as
inadequate. For example, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania rejected the use of hypnotically
refreshed tesf!mony in Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981), holding that
such testimony did not satisfy the Frye general
acceptance test. The court commented:

New Jersey Supreme Court, although recognizing
the problems with hypnotically refreshed testimony, did not hold such evidence inadmissible.
Instead, the court ruled that hypnotically refreshed
testimony may be admissible if the trial court finds
that "the use of hypnosis and the procedure followed in the particular case was a reasonably
reliable means of restoring the witness' memory."
/d. at 95.
In addition, the court adopted a number of procedural requirements that had been proposed by
Dr. Martin Orne, an expert on hypnosis. See infra.
First, "a psychiatrist or psychologist experienced
in the use of hypnosis must conduct the session."
Second, "the professional conducting the hypnotic
session should be independent of and not regularly employed by the prosecutor, investigator or
defense." Third, "any information given to the
hypnotist by law enforcement personnel or the
defense prior to the hypnotic session must be
recorded, either in writing or another suitable
form." Fourth, "before inducing hypnosis the hypnotist should obtain from the subject a detailed
description of the facts as the subject remembers
them." Fifth, "all contacts between the hypnotist
and the subject must be recorded." According to
the court, the "use of videotape, the only effective
record of visual cues, is strongly encouraged but
not mandatory." Sixth, "only the hypnotist and the
subject should be present during any phase of the
hypnotic session, including the pre-hypnotic testing and the post-hypnotic interview." /d. at 96-97.
These requirements are designed to prevent suggestion, both intentional and unintentional, and to
preserve a record for review.
The court also held that the party seeking to
introduce hypnotically refreshed testimony must
establish its admissibility by clear and convincing
evidence. /d. at 97. According to the court, the
prosecution failed to satisfy this burden in the
Hurd case. The court was especially concern~d
about the conduct of a detective who repeatedly
encouraged the witness to make an identification
and to overcome any doubts that the witness
~xpressed about that identification.
One other point deserves comment. The Hurd
court held that the use of hypnotically refreshed
testimony met the general acceptance test of Frye,
at least under certain conditions. In this respect,
the court specifically rejected the conclusions of
the courts in Mena and Mack. According to the
Hurd court, the issue was not whether hypnosis is
"generally accepted as a means of reviving truthful
or historically accurate recall." /d. at 92. Instead,
the issue is whether hypnosis "is able to yield
recollections as accurate as those of an ordinary
witness, which likewise are often historically inaccurate." /d.
Post-Hurd Cases
The cases decided immediately after Hurd fall
into three groups. First, several cases adopted the
Hurd approach, applying procedural safeguards as
a precondition to admissibility. See State v.
Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246, 253-54 (App.

The Hurd court's rationale that hypnotically-refreshed
recollection might as well be admissible since ordinary eyewitness accounts are also vulnerable to error
and inaccuracies does not do full justice to the fact
that "the traditional guaranties of trustworthiness as
well as the jury's ability to view the demeanor of the
witness are wholly ineffective to reveal distortions of
memory induced by hypnotic process." ... It is unchallenged that a jury can more critically analyze a
witness' ability to perceive, remember, and articulate
his recollections when such testimony has not been
hypnotically-refreshed. /d. at 177.

See also People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145,
310 N.W.2d 306 (1981); Palmer v. State, 210 Neb.
206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981).
Finally, in Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280
(Wyo. 1982), the Wyoming Supreme Court upheld
the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony. The court recognized the split in other jurisdictions, but followed the "majority" of courts
which tiave held that the influence of hypnosis
affects the credibility, not the competence, of the
witness. The court specifically declined to adopt
the Hurd safeguards, although it commented that
adherence to these safeguards may be advisable.
/d. at 1283. See also Commonwealth v. Juvenile,
412 N.E.2d 339 (Mass. 1980) (remand for findings
on reliability of hypnotically aided testimony).
People v. Shirley
The most comprehensive decision on the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony was
written by the California Supreme Court in People
v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 243 (1982). After discussing the evolution of
judicial opinion on the subject, the court found the
"safeguards" announced in Hurd to be inadequate.
According to the court, those safeguards did not
protect against many of the dangers associated
with hypnotically refreshed testimony:
[W]e observe that certain dangers of hypnosis are not
even addressed by the Hurd requirements: virtually all
of those rules are designed to prevent the hypnotist
from exploiting the suggestibility of the subject; none
will directly avoid the additional risks, recognized
elsewhere in Hurd, that the subject (1) will lose his
critical judgment and begin to credit "memories" that
were formerly viewed as unreliable, (2) will confuse
actual recall with confabulation and will be unable to
distinguish between the two, and (3) will exhibit an
unwarranted confidence in the validity of his ensuing
recollection. /d. at 255.

The court next held that the Frye general accept4
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ance test was the applicable standard for determining the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed
testimony, rejecting arguments that the Frye test
applied only to expert testimony or to new techniques involving physical evidence. /d. at 263-64.
The court also explicitly rejected an earlier California decision, People v. Diggs, 112 Cal. App. 3d 522,
169 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1980), which had found that hypnotically refreshed testimony satisfied the Frye
test. Finally, after canvassing the scientific literature on the subject, the court found that hypnotically refreshed testimony was not generally
accepted by the scientific community. /d. at 272.
In the course of its opinion, the court enumerated the principal dangers of such evidence:

cally refreshed testimony had not been generally
accepted by the scientific community as required
by Frye. As noted above, Harding had been the
seminal case admitting such evidence. In the interval between Harding and Collins, the court had
upheld admissibility in State v. Temoney, 45 Md.
App. 569, 414 A.2d 240 (1980), vacated on other
grounds, 290 Md. 251, 429 A.2d 1018 (1981), and
presaged the Collins result in Polk v. State, 48 Md.
App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041 (1981), when it remanded
that case for a trial court determination on the
general acceptance issue.
In Pearson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 468 (Ind. 1982),
the Indiana Supreme Court held that "the fact of
hypnosis should be a matter of weight with the
trier of fact but not a per se disqualification of the
witness." /d. at 473. Thus, the controversy
continues. The courts are divided into three
groups: (1) those adopting a per se rule of
exclusion, (2) those conditioning admissibility on
compliance With procedural safeguards, and (3)
those holding that hypnosis affects the weight, but
not admissibility, of the evidence.
See also Burnett v. State, 32 Grim. L. Rptr. 2175
(Tex. Grim. App. Oct. 27, 1982) (en bane) (tape of
prehypnotic interview of defendant protected by
attorney-client privilege).

1. Hypnosis is by its nature a process of suggestion, and one of its primary effects is that the person
hypnotized becomes extremely receptive to suggestions that he perceives as emanating from the hypnotist ....
2. The person under hypnosis experiences a compelling desire to please the hypnotist by reacting positively to these suggestions, and hence to produce the
particular responses he believes are expected of
him ....
3. During the hypnotic session, neither the subject
nor the hypnotist can distinguish between true memories and pseudomemories of various kinds in the
reported recall; and when the subject repeats that
recall in the waking state (e.g., in a trial), neither an
expert witness nor a lay observer (e.g., the judge or
jury) can make a similar distinction ....
4. Nor is such guarantee [of veracity] furnished by
the confidence with which the memory is initially
reported or subsequently related: a witness who is
uncertain of his recollections before being hypnotized
will become convinced by that process that the story
he told under hypnosis is true and correct in every
respect. /d. at 271-72.

EXPERT OPINIONS

Two experts, Drs. Bernard Diamond and Martin
Orne, have played influential roles in the court
decisions. Indeed, in People v. Shirley, 31 Cal.3d
18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 234, 270 n.45 (1982),
the California Supreme Court identified these two
experts as the "most persuasive spokesmen for
the relevant scientific community." Dr. Diamond's
views are set forth in Diamond, Inherent Problems
in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective
Witness, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 313 (1980):

The court, however, did outline several limitations on its holding. First, it noted that a "previously hypnotized witness is not incompetent in
the strict sense .... Accordingly, if the prosecution
should wish to question such a witness on a topic
wholly unrelated to the events that were the subject of the hypnotic session, his testimony as to
that topic would not be rendered inadmissible by
the present rule." /d. at 273. Second, the court did
not foreclose the use of hypnosis for "purely investigative purposes." /d. Third, the court held that
the admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony
is not "reversible per se." /d. at 274.

I believe that once a potential witness has been hypnotized for the purpose of enhancing memory his
recollections have been so contaminated that he is
rendered effectively incompetent to testify. Hypnotized persons, being extremely suggestible, graft onto
their memories, fantasies or suggestions deliberately
or unwittingly communicated by the hypnotist. After
hypnosis the subject cannot differentiate between a
true recollection and a fantasy or a suggested detail.
Neither can any expert or trier of fact. This risk is so
great, in my view, that the use of hypnosis by police
on a potential witness is tantamount to the destruction or fabrication of evidence. /d. at 314.

Recent Cases
In People v. Hughes, 88 A.D.2d 17, 452.N.Y.S.2d
929 (1982), a New York appellate court ruled hypnotically refreshed testimony inadmissible on the
grounds that such evidence had not achieved general acceptance under the Frye test. Until the
issue is settled by the N.Y. Court of Appeals,
Hughes would appear to overrule a number of N.Y.
trial court opinions, cited above, that had permitted the use of such testimony.
In Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d
1272 (1982), the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
:>verrufed the Harding case, holding that hypnoti-

Dr. Martin Orne, the second expert, although in
agreement with most of Dr. Diamond's positions,
does differ in one important respect: he is unwilling to state categorically that hypnotically
influenced testimony should never be used at trial.
Instead, he has proposed a number of safeguards
that should be followed before such testimony is
admitted. These safeguards were initially incorporated in an amicus curiae affidavit which was filed
in Quagfino v. California, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 875
(1978), and became the basis for the safeguards
eventually adopted by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Hurd, supra. It is important to note that
5

these safeguards are minimum requirements.
"Orne maintains that the use of these safeguards
may not prevent contamination." Note, The Use of
Hypnosis to Refresh Memory: Invaluable Tool or
Dangerous Device?, 60 Wash. U.L.Q. 1059, 1075
(1982).
Dr. Orne has written:

tioned upon procedural safeguards: "Safeguards
cannot render the hypnotically recalled testimony
reliable and therefore admissible." /d. at 1273. In
addition, the court held that the Mena holding precluded the testimony of all hypnotized witnesses
at trials after Mena was decided. /d. at 1276.
Accordingly, the victims in Collins were incompetent.
On a motion for rehearing, the court modified
Mena and its prior decision in Collins. The court
again held that hypnotically enhanced testimony
failed to satisfy the Frye test; it also rejected
again the Hurd safeguards. Nevertheless, the court
modified one aspect of its prior holdings: "[A] witness will be permitted to testify with regard to
those matters which he or she was able to recall
and relate prior to hypnosis. Thus, for example, the
rape victim would be free to testify to the occur.,r_ence of the crime, the lack of consent, the injury
inflicted and the like, assuming that such matters
were remembered and related to the authorities
prior to use of hypnosis." /d. at 1295. This
investigatory use of hypnosis, according to the
court, must be accompanied by safeguards. /d. at
1296. The court also acknowledged that even
under this approach, the police "will seldom dare
... use hypnosis as an investigatory tool because
they will thereby risk making the witness incompetent if it is later determined the testimony of that
witness is essential." /d. at 1295.
The Collins position has been accepted by other
courts. See Strong v. State, 435 N.E.2d 969 (Ind.
1982); State v. Wallach, 110 Mich. App. 37, 312
N.W.2d 387 (1981); State v. Koehler, 312 N.W.2d 108
(Minn. 1981); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 313
N.W.2d 648 (1981) (concurring opinion); People v.
Hughes, 88 A.D. 2d 17, 452 N.Y.S.2d 929, 932 (1982);
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 439 A.2d 805 (Pa. Super.
1982). See also State v. Commeau, 438 A.2d 454,
458 (Me. 1981). This approach appears to differ
from the California position set forth in Shirley. It
also conflicts with Dr. Diamond's position that
once hypnotized, the witness' testimony is "contaminated."

[H]ypnosis may be useful in some instances to help
bring back forgotten memories following an accident
or a crime while in others a witness might, with the
same conviction, produce information that is totally
inaccurate. This means that material produced during
hypnosis or immediately after hypnosis, inspired by
hypnotic revivification, may or may not be historically
accurate, As long as this material is subject to inde·
pendent verification, its utility is considerable and the
risk attached to the procedure minimal. There is no
way, however, by which anyone-even a psychologist
or psychiatrist with extensive training in the field of
hypnosis-can for any particular piece of information
determine whether it is an actual memory or a confabulation unless there is independent verification.
Thus, there are instances when subsequently verified
accurate license plate numbers were recalled in hypnosis by individuals who previously could not remem·
ber them. In the Chowchilla kidnapping case ... , the
license plate number was helpful in the initial investi·
gation of the case (although ultimately not required in
the courtroom because of the abundance of other evidence available). On the other hand, a good many
license plate numbers that have been recalled under
hypnosis by witnesses in other cases in fact belonged
to cars and drivers none of which, as it turned out
after investigation, could have been involved. Orne,
The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, In 3 Crime
and Justice: An Annual Review of Research 61, 73-74
(ed. M. Toney & N. Morris 1982).

PREHYPNOTIC TESTIMONY

Most of the cases discussed above focus on the.
admissibility of testimony or statements obtained
during or after hypnosis. A related issue involves
the admissibility of testimony concerning matters
recalled prior to hypnosis. In People v. Shirley,
supra, the CaliforniaSupreme Court, while not
foreclosing the investigative use of hypnosis,
made it clear that a hypnotized witness was
incompetent to testify about facts discussed in the
hypnotic session. The witness, however, could testify about unrelated matters. /d. at 273-74.
In State v. Mena, discussed above, the Arizona
Supreme Court took the same position. That court,
however, modified its position in a later case.
State ex rei. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz.
180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982) (supplemental opinion). In
Collins, several rape victims had been hypnotized
in an attempt to discover more information about
the identity of the assailant. No new information
developed from this process. The defendant was
later apprehended as he approached a police
decoy; The defense, citing Mena, moved to disqualify the victims as witnesses. The court reaffirmed its earlier position, holding hypnotically
influenced testimony inadmissible because of its
inherent unreliability and its impingement on the
Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination. /d. at
1269. The court also rejected admissibility condi-

REFERENCES
Additional references include:
C. McCornick, Evidence 510 (2d ed. 1972);
A Moenssens & F. lnbau, Scientific Evidence in
Criminal Cases 632-38 (2d ed. 1978);
E. Monaghan, Hypnosis in Criminal Investigations
(1980);
Dillhoff, The Admissibility of Hypnotically
Influenced Testimony, 4 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 1 (1977);
Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic
Statements: Is the Law of Evidence Susceptible?,
38 Ohio St. L.J. 567 (1977);
Note, The Probative Value of Testimony from the
Hypnotically Refreshed Recollection, 14 Akron L.
Rev. 609 (1981).
Note, Hypnotically Induced Testimony: Credibility
versus Admissibility, 57 Ind. L.J. 349 (1982).
6

